On the Impermissibility of Telling Misleading Truths in Kantian Ethics

Shelley, Cameron (2012) On the Impermissibility of Telling Misleading Truths in Kantian Ethics. Open Journal of Philosophy, 02 (02). pp. 89-91. ISSN 2163-9434

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Abstract

Sandel (2009) has recently revisited the issue of the moral permissibility of telling misleading truths in a Kantian ethical framework. His defense of its permissibility relies on assimilating it to simple truth telling, and discounting its relationship with simple lying. This article presents a refutation of Sandel’s case. It is argued that comparison of misleading truths with telling truths or lies is inconclusive. Instead, comparison with telling of leading truths is appropriate. With this comparison in view, it is clear that telling misleading truths is not consistent with the Categorical Imperative, meaning that they are not morally permissible from a Kantian perspective.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: Bengali Archive > Social Sciences and Humanities
Depositing User: Unnamed user with email support@bengaliarchive.com
Date Deposited: 13 Feb 2023 12:40
Last Modified: 28 May 2024 05:54
URI: http://science.archiveopenbook.com/id/eprint/245

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